ECP and Centrica’s Acquisition of Grain LNG
Deal Overview
Parties to the transaction: Energy Capital Partners (ECP) and Centrica plc as joint venture partners with 50/50 ownership as buyers through purchasing vehicle Garden Bidco Limited; National Grid plc as the seller.
Total transaction size: Enterprise value of £1.5 billion (approx. $2 billion).
Transaction structure: Cash acquisition with non-recourse project finance debt of approx. £1.1 billion and 50% equity investment of approx. £200 million by Centrica.
Closing date: 28 November 2025.
The buyers of this deal are ECP and Centrica plc as joint venture partners with 50/50 ownership through a purchasing vehicle, Garden Bidco Limited. The seller is National Grid plc. The deal diversified ECP’s portfolio, which was focused on energy investments in America, and allowed Centrica to acquire an asset with bridge power sources key to the transition, as such, preparing them for the transition towards the net-zero transition goals of the UK, by replacing coal which emits more carbon and by the potential of LNG terminals to import lower-carbon fuels in the future. Further, given the 100% secured contract capacity of the LNG terminal until 2029, the buyers have secured inflation-linked cash flows until then, tapering down to 50% until 2045. National Grid, the owner of Grain LNG, disposed of the subsidiary so they can focus on net-zero power sources instead of bridge power sources, as aligned with its strategic focus. This deal was reviewed by the European Commission and was subject to the National Security and Investment Act 2021 approval as ECP is a foreign company acquiring an asset in one of the 17 sensitive sectors.
Company Details
Acquirer 1: Centrica plc
Centrica plc was founded in 1997. The CEO at the time of the deal was Chris O’Shea. Centrica’s ethos is to energise a greener, fairer future. On announcement of the deal, the share price of Centrica was £1.68, and on completion it increased to £1.71, with the market capitalisation range being £7.6 billion to £7.8 billion. Their ethos is that climate change is the single biggest threat and thus they are focusing on delivering net zero. They operate in the Utilities, Gas, Water and Multi-utilities sectors. Centrica’s main competitors in the UK energy market are the other five major suppliers: EDF, E.ON, SSE, Scottish Power and Octopus Energy. These competitors all share a common ethos point of accelerating the net-zero energy transition. However, Centrica differs in that it is heavily integrated in the energy services supply chain through its ownership of British Gas services, which provides maintenance services for home systems. Further, Centrica’s 10-year mission is to reduce internal emissions by 50% by 2032 and become a net-zero business by 2040, 10 years ahead of most companies’ net-zero by 2050 goal.
The company’s core services include supplying energy, installing and offering business decarbonisation solutions. The company is innovative in its investment in critical energy infrastructure supporting the net-zero transition. through investing in battery storage, hydrogen infrastructure and advanced modular nuclear reactors.
In 1997, Centrica demerged from British Gas plc, inheriting gas supply services and beginning with 18 million customers. The following year, it entered the electricity supply market and expanded its service offering to North America in 2000 by acquiring Direct Energy. The firm divested from its North American Direct Energy business, as the market was stated to be too competitive, and to focus on its core markets, the UK and Ireland, by acquiring capital by selling its North American business to NRG Energy for $3.6 billion. In 2024, the firm made a £120 million commitment to battery and gas developments, while also partnering with UKIB to invest in the UK’s first commercial-scale Liquid Air Energy Storage. This allowed it to be key part in the UK’s energy security, as at the time it was stated to have the potential of becoming the cheapest and greenest energy source for the UK.
The firm’s strengths lie in its established customer base of approximately 25% of UK households. Further, the company has a diversified energy portfolio throughout the entire lifecycle of energy, supply, generation, storage and infrastructure, with 20% stake in UK nuclear power stations. Particularly, it made a £3 billion commitment to Sizewell C and Grain LNG investment in 2024, showcasing its commitment to diversifying energy solutions. This allowed an advantage over competitors; they compete over retail price, whereas Centrica is aiming to focus on power generation, which is crucial following the Russian sanctions affecting LNG imports, showcasing a resilient model matching the UK’s energy security demands.
The market in which the company operates has faced intense regulatory pressure: the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) has implemented price caps and introduced a fitness-for-purpose framework to protect consumers. Further, following geopolitical disruptions such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the UK government policy has prioritised domestic energy security. However, most importantly, the central development in the company’s sector is the net zero energy transition; Centrica has made major investments in the transition by its Rough storage redevelopment, battery storage projects and the acquisition of Grain LNG.
The company has had major success in recent years; however, it has suffered notable issues. Under their CEO, Chris O’Shea, Centrica reported the highest annual earnings in the company’s history in 2022 and 2023. This was achieved through management job cuts and the removal of management layers, and by refocusing on core UK and Ireland operations. By selling their North American business for $3.6 billion in 2021, this enabled a focus on higher returns in their core market.
Acquirer 2: Energy Capital Partners (ECP)
ECP, founded in April 2005, operates as a private partnership. The president and managing partner at the time of the deal was Doug Kimmelman. They operate in private equity, focusing on Energy transition infrastructure investment. ECP focuses on investing in electricity and sustainability infrastructure, emphasising its role in supporting grid reliability and advancing to a lower-carbon future while recognising the importance of natural gas to keep grids resilient. ECP is one of the largest owners of power generation and renewables in the United States.
The firm was founded in 2005 by former Goldman Sachs executives, establishing a specialised energy infrastructure focus from the outset, and raised $2.25 billion by a debut fund in 2007. The key evolution of its services was in 2024 by its merger with Bridgepoint Group, creating an $87 billion private assets platform; this established a European presence for ECP and transitioned it from a US-centric private partnership to a global platform. In 2024, it entered a $50 billion strategic partnership with KKR to address data centre power demand which is forecasted to require over $1 trillion in investment by 2030. This allows KKR to combine their expertise in digital infrastructure along with its established 8GW data centre pipeline with ECP’s 100GW power generation platform, so that it can accelerate the development of data centres by addressing the critical shortage of electricity needed to power data centres.
ECP is one of the largest private owners of natural gas and infrastructure assets, owning over 83 GW of power generation across all major U.S. power markets. It displays notable vertical integration within its supply chain by its majority stake in ProEnergy, an aeroderivative gas turbine platform, which provides repair and maintenance services for turbines and operates as an original equipment manufacturer for delivering gas power generation solutions to utility customers. Finally, its partnership with KKR allows for massive capital deployment capacities for data centre infrastructure.
ECP’s history is marked by both significant successes and failures. In 2017, ECP led the $17 billion take-private of Calpine, delisting it from the NYSE in March 2018. In 2022, ECP increased its direct stake in Calpine by completing a $1.6 billion continuation fund and increasing its ability to pursue objectives such as delivering safe and dependable power generation. The 2024 merger with Bridgepoint made ECP a global leader in middle-market investing and provided permanent capital access through Bridgepoint Group. Its partnership with KKR in 2024 expanded its presence in AI infrastructure investments, and an additional $50 billion UAE-based partnership for data centre investments increased its global platform capabilities.
The company’s industry in which it operates has had notable developments, allowing it to expand and seize profitable opportunities. Major investment opportunities were created by decarbonisation needs and the need for a reliable natural gas supply for Europe, following geopolitical factors such as the sanctions on Russia and the Eastern European supply line being disrupted due to conflict.
Target: Grain LNG
The target, Grain LNG, is a liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal on the Isle of Grain. Its operations commenced in 2005, and it operated as a National Grid subsidiary. At that time, the CEO of National Grid was Roger Urwin. The market valuation of Grain LNG was £1.5 billion enterprise value. Grain LNG’s industry is LNG importation, storage and regasification infrastructure. As a subsidiary of National Grid, Grain LNG operated under a mission to support the UK’s energy security through a reliable LNG import capacity.
Grain LNG’s core offerings are, as stated, LNG importation and regasification, and further offerings include ship reloading and transhipment services and connection to the National Transmission System (NTS) and local distribution zones. Its key strength lies in its scale, as Europe’s largest LNG regasification terminal and the UK’s largest LNG importation terminal.
Significant developments include securing a 25-year contract for secured terminal utilisation through 2045, a 16-year contract with Venture Global, a US-based company. This deal gave Venture Global the ability to access 3MTPA of LNG storage and regasification capacity per year, which is equivalent to covering up to 5% of UK gas demand.
Within the LNG industry, LNG demand is projected to meet circa 60% of UK gas demand by 2050. Further, geopolitical factors increase the importance of LNG for European energy security and UK domestic gas production decline, increasing reliance on LNG. Overall, this created demand for LNG infrastructure provided by Grain LNG. The UK LNG terminal market consists of three terminals, making it an oligopoly: Grain LNG, South Hook and Dragon. Grain LNG is differentiated from the former two by being the largest by capacity and storage. It also operates under the Ofgem rTPA exemption, which allows it to secure long-term contracts under Section 19C of the Gas Act 1986, while competitors have different regulatory structures.
The Acquisition
The deal was an acquisition, consisting of acquiring 100% of the shares in Grain LNG from National Grid by the 50/50 joint venture between Centrica and ECP. The purchase price was the enterprise value of Grain LNG, £1.5 billion. Both Centrica and ECP made an equity investment of £200 million each, and the remaining £1.1 billion was non-recourse project finance at Bidco level. This method of finance secures the debt solely by the project’s cash flows and assets instead of the company’s assets, however it typically comes with higher interest rates due to the lender incurring higher risk.
On 14 August 2025, the deal was publicly announced and signed, and the Sale and purchase agreement was signed on the same day. On 28 November 2025, the transaction was completed, following receipt of regulatory approvals. In 2026-208, Centrica expects cash distributions of approximately £20 million per annum. The first major contract recontracting window of the current contracted position is in 2029.
Motivation
Centrica had several motivations in entering the deal. First, securing Grain LNG in essence meant securing 50% ownership of Europe’s largest LNG terminal which further diversified their existing portfolio and broadened their net-zero transition capacity, consisting of Rough Storage, the Barrow and Easington gas terminals, and Sizewell C nuclear.
ECP had similar motivations for the deal. First, acquiring this asset meant establishing itself in UK critical energy infrastructure. It also means diversifying their reach from North America to Europe. Further, the contracted cash flow is long-term and inflation-linked, meaning that it is adjusted for inflation following a price index such as the Retail Prices Index, typically every eight months.
Finally, the buyers also had aligned motivations. Parties were aligned in that they both had the strategy of investing in regulated and contracted assets supporting the energy transition.
For National Grid, motivation differs. National Grid wanted to focus on low-carbon transition in energy, specifically and thus wanted to divest from LNG terminal operations. The sale proceeds, £1.5 billion, would enable them to reinvest in UK energy infrastructure. Further, removing a subsidiary eases reporting and governance requirements. As LNG is not net-zero but instead bridge/transitional fuel, on paper, it would allow them to report better emissions for energy, where their strategic focus is.
Integration
The acquisition was made through a 50/50 joint venture structure through Garden Topco Limited. Board representation was split equally between the two partners, so they had a balanced oversight of the decision. Despite the change in ownership, Grain LNG’s management team has been retained and continues to operate the terminal as an independent company, effectively retaining the key talent while working closely with the management from Centrica and ECP. The key benefit of retaining the management team is that the LNG suppliers get to work with the same staff across the terminal, which is crucial given that no new suppliers will be entering before 2029, reducing potential for friction while also keeping long-standing relationships and expertise. Further, ECP also chooses to manage their portfolio by partnering with active management teams and discussing financial and operational decisions instead of actively managing day-to-day operations. Similarly, Centrica chooses to stay active in managing its main segments, while subsidiaries as part of their net-zero investment portfolio, operate independently under their established management teams.
In terms of financial projections, Centrica expects to generate approximately £100 million per annum in Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortisation (EBITDA) from its 50% share of Grain LNG. The investment is projected to deliver an internal rate of return (IRR) of 9% and equity IRR exceeding 14%. This is essential as Centrica’s target is to achieve £1.6 billion in EBITDA by the end of 2028.
Centrica assigned Slaughter and May as their legal representation, possessing extensive experience in energy M&A, having advised on more than 25 oil and gas deals exceeding $1 billion and have advised some of the first LNG projects. Further, they have advised Centrica on its Sizewell C nuclear project, another part of the company’s diversification strategy, which was running concurrently to the Grain LNG deal. ECP and Garden Bidco selected Latham & Watkins, recognised for cross-border infrastructure mandates, ideal for ECP, which initially had an operational focus in America but is now diversifying globally. They also advised ECP in its acquisition in ProEnergy which formed part of the vertical supply chain integration for ECP, across energy transition aspects of the transaction. As it can be seen, both parties engaged law firms they had a long-standing relationship with, having previously been advised by the energy transition mandates. Overall, the above selections indicate that the transaction was expected to create complex regulatory matters, while also recognising that both buyers needed their respective law firms to understand their business goals as shown by the continued engagement from previous deals.
Legal Contentions & Regulatory Impact
Legal & Regulatory Issues
For the acquisition, the Investment Security Unit (ISU) raised a National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSIA 2021) review; the European Commission also raised a merger control review.
The National security review was required due to Grain LNG’s classification as critical infrastructure in the energy sector, requiring mandatory notification. The NSIA 2021 was enacted as a response to concerns about foreign investment in critical UK assets, to protect national security while keeping the UK an attractive investment destination. This established mandatory notification for 17 sectors, including the Energy sector. If concerns arise, the government has the power to block the transaction or impose conditions.
The European Commission was involved as the parties may have EU-wide activities. They were notified of the merger pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation. The verdict was that it falls within the scope of the Merger Regulation and of paragraph 5(a) of the Commission Notice. This was the verdict due to Centrica being an energy supplier and ECP is an investment firm, so there is no horizontal overlap, and there is a minimal vertical relationship, as even though Centrica would use the LNG terminal, it does not own competing terminals in the EU, so the parties are not active at different levels of the same supply chain. This allowed for simplified treatment under paragraph 5(a) of the Commission Notice, which means that there are no competition concerns and approval can be granted faster. The merger was not opposed and was declared compatible with the internal market and with the EEA agreement under Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. The simplified treatment led to faster clearance, with the acquisition being approved within 3 weeks (from the 9th of September to the 1st of October).
The NSIA approval was a mandatory condition precedent, so without clearance, the transaction would not be allowed to proceed. The contentions are of significant political sensitivity, considering that Grain LNG provides almost a third of UK gas demand. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the UK and Europe have sought reliable sources to keep up with energy demands, and importantly, avoid paying premiums to meet energy demands such as those incurred from the conflict or by tariffs; Grain LNG effectively addresses these concerns. Further, the NSIA approval was essential in ensuring that Grain LNG would be used in a beneficial manner to national energy interests, and not just a foreign investment which would take away a significant source of energy.
Deal Implications
NSIA approval was granted due to several factors. First, the terminal already operated under long-term commercial capacity contracts with multiple contractors; thus, the risk that new owners could manipulate the supply would be reduced. Second, due to the split ownership model, there is no exclusive control over Grain LNG, and both parties would be trusted not to jeopardise national interests, especially as Centrica is a UK company. No condition was imposed by the NSIA.
Given the approval by both the European Commission and the NSIA, there is no immediate legal concern post-closing. Further, as the long-term capacity contracts have contracted Grain LNG at 100% until 2029, there is no immediate concern of contracting.
Given that South Hook’s ownership has remained unchanged since its construction, an apt comparison is with Dragon LNG as another LNG terminal in the UK. Dragon LNG’s ownership has changed hands multiple times: Ancala Partners acquired Petronas’s 50% stake in 2020; this 50% stake was then acquired by VTTI, a Dutch energy infrastructure specialist, in 2024, and the remaining 50% remained with Shell. However, as the NSIA approval requirement came into force on 4 January 2022, there was no interaction with the 2020 acquisition. Further, the 2024 acquisition did not raise any NSIA approval requirements.
Both terminals have a 50% split ownership model. Further, both consist of a UK-based and a foreign owner. However, Grain LNG was a full acquisition, whereas VTTI acquired the 50% stake from Petronas, a Malaysian oil and gas company. In both cases, UK companies hold partial ownership, potentially to ensure NSIA approval; however, information not relating to NSIA approval is not available on Dragon LNG’s publications. Notably, the Dragon LNG 2024 acquisition was approved without heavy merger enforcement, showcasing the trend of continued approval and simplified merger review. It should be noted that at this moment, it is false to conclude that the EU Commission is lenient, as both LNG terminals have partial UK ownership, did not raise competition concerns, and the two deals support the UK’s energy security goals. For the NSIA framework, there is insufficient information from LNG terminal deals to conclude on enforcement trends. If there had been full foreign ownership by a competitor in the LNG market instead, merger measures would likely have been imposed by the EU Commission. Similarly, the NSIA approval could not have been granted as foreign owners may not prioritise the UK’s energy security, resulting in the Government unwinding or blocking of the deal.
Industry Impact
Grain LNG is a fully operational LNG importation terminal with significant expansion capacity. It has been operational since 2005 and underwent capacity expansion in 2025. Its operating license is granted under the Gas Act 1986 (as amended) and operates under regulated third-party access (rTPA) exemption from Ofgem. The exemptions are subject to conditions such as the facility not affecting the competition and that the project would not be financially viable without this exemption. This exemption allows Grain LNG not to have to offer access to its storage regasification capacity to any party in the same way regulated pipelines have to and thus keep operating as intended under their long-term contracts. It has long-term capacity contracts with 50% capacity secured until 2045, effectively securing inflation-linked cash flows.
Thus, this deal impacts the industry in that so long as the Ofgem exemption conditions are complied with, they could potentially maintain their profitability by renewing with the providers of the already secured contracts, which secures the owners’ cash flows. Specifically, to cover the remaining 50% uncontracted capacity until 2045, Grain LNG may seek to recontract with the existing suppliers. By contracting on the same terms and avoiding onboarding processes with new clients, this guarantees predictable annual returns. Consequently, new entrants may face difficulties in entering the LNG imports market under this model, and are better placed to contract with LNG terminals once their exemptions are revoked or the previous importers stop recontracting for capacity.
Further, as the £1.1 billion non-recourse project debt is secured against the terminal’s assets and cash flows, it makes sense for the owners to prioritise cash flow consistency and not introduce new suppliers with published terms, which is achieved by complying with the Ofgem conditions. Thus, priority would be placed on following the Ofgem conditions to secure preferable contracts, so it would be important to avoid affecting competition in the market. Several of the terminal’s Ofgem exemptions expire between 2026 to 2033, meaning that there is the potential for the uncontracted capacities to then fall under standard rTPA and have to be offered to the market non-discriminatorily. Along with the trend that the exemptions granted are shorter per grant, from 25 down to 19 years, this indicates that Ofgem may be shifting towards prioritising open market access in the future.
Additionally, the industry is further impacted by this deal in several ways. The shift in ownership from National Grid to Centrica and ECP shows a reduction in independent UK LNG terminal owners. In contrast, the competition impact is limited, as the LNG market is a three-terminal oligopoly, and that has remained unaffected. For the infrastructure investment market in the UK, it is ultimately positive as it demonstrates that the UK permits foreign investment in critical energy assets if appropriate ownership structures are in place, such as the Centrica/ECP 50/50 ownership model.
This transaction fits into the broader relationship between LNG and net-zero; however, there is a caveat. Compared to standard domestic coal production, the LNG process at its baseline may be more energy-intensive throughout the whole lifecycle. It is typically less intensive to coal up to the point of combustion. However, Grain LNG or any other terminal has the potential to become less carbon-intensive with modifications to lifecycle processes such as operating with Carbon Capture and Storage, which captures carbon and permanently relocates it to secure underground geological formations. Grain LNG is planning to introduce such a mechanism on-site to make LNG a more suitable bridge fuel for net-zero.
House View
Until 2029, the deal has secured sustainable cash flow for the acquirers as 100% of the contracted capacity is contracted and is inflation-linked. The key concern in the future is selecting the correct contracts when the opportunity arises to ensure the terminal remains profitable, for example, to fulfil the capacity remainder until 2038. Given the net-zero energy transition, it is possible that there could be stricter carbon regulations introduced then, with potentially taxation on bridge fuel such as LNG, so it is likely that it could yield a less favourable IRR closer to 2050.
On that end, the biggest risk ECP and Centrica face is the future regulatory environment. The UK has implemented measures which curb LNG, such as phasing out Russian imports by 2027 through targeted sanctions. Further, in December 2025, the UK decided to withdraw financial support for the Mozambique LNG project due to reports of ethical conduct by operators and criticism that the project exacerbates the climate crisis. These events show that the UK Government is not hesitant to phase out of LNG if necessary. Thus, the Government may be willing to introduce penalties for carbon lifecycle performance closer to 2050. This is especially harmful for LNG, as it is notably more energy-intensive than domestic coal production throughout the overall process, despite providing less hazardous emissions upfront. Further, if sanctions increase, the terminal’s contracted capacity may not reach 100% after 2029, resulting in less revenue.
As such, ECP could choose to diversify in the coming years by investing in net-zero power sources like hydrogen and wind, or even by making Grain LNG less carbon-intensive. A large amount of energy is used in the initial regasification process of LNG; therefore, using zero-emission sources like solar or hydroelectric could significantly reduce lifecycle emissions. Bio-LNG is also a choice to invest in, as it could replace natural gas in the LNG process, as researchers have found that it is compatible with the existing LNG infrastructure. What comes down to adopting these for Grain LNG is the return on investment and risk appetite; if ECP is willing to take the risk to utilise these new technologies, it could potentially avoid any penalties imposed by the Government as a means to push towards less carbon-intensive methods.
Other private capital firms with a sizeable US presence in the LNG market would be motivated to come into the LNG market in the UK; this includes Carlyle, which has a team which explicitly targets LNG terminals, and I Squared Capital. This is because of the uncertainty surrounding the US market, arising from the volatility of gas prices in the US after the Strait of Hormuz conflict and the projections for peak natural gas usage for the US, forecasting that it will taper down after 2032. In contrast, as the UK LNG market has not shown any signs of tapering off yet, it may be their next option for investing in. Therefore, US private capital firms may raise a mandated infrastructure fund with a lifespan of 12-15 years, to seize a market which has not matured. The uncertainty lies around whether the other companies that own LNG terminals may be willing to sell their share; if not, private capital firms may be incentivised to support new terminal development, with carbon-friendly capabilities as discussed in the previous paragraph.
Private capital firms would engage law firms with expertise in such mandates. Latham & Watkins would be a suitable adviser, as it is preeminent in deals involving US infrastructure funds, including clients such as Carlyle. Another suitable law firm for such mandates is Ashurst, which has advised the Dragon LNG acquisition and has been involved in the entire lifecycle of key energy transition projects, such as the £2 billion 882MW Moray West offshore wind farm, while also advising the government on net-zero technologies. White & Case also advises across the LNG chain, including upstream, midstream and on both the sponsor and lender side, making them a likely choice for LNG mandates.
In terms of the laws relevant to the deal, they create a market where safe foreign investment is encouraged. NSIA approval is not a deterrent to foreign investors, as shown by the approval trend; the 50/50 ownership structure shown by this deal was sufficient to ensure that the national security requirements are met. In that regard, given that foreign investment could enable long-term technological advancement in the energy field by increasing capital, which can be utilised for research & development in making LNG more carbon-friendly and aid the UK in securing energy for the short term, the current NSIA framework is ideal. Similarly, the EU Commission did not scrutinise this deal and instead granted simplified treatment, showcasing a favourable framework for EU companies looking to invest in the UK’s energy market.
If, as discussed above, US or foreign private capital firms make the shift towards investing in critical UK energy assets, the NSIA framework would certainly become stricter. The current framework has been lenient as the Government’s budget may not cover investments to advance technological innovation towards net zero; once a large amount of assets is under foreign ownership, this would alarm the ISU to become stricter in approval. Similarly, there would be competition concerns where major private capital firms, such as Carlyle, may be buying several assets and thus be able to fix market prices for LNG, leading to Phase I or II merger review procedures by the EU Commission, which take a longer time to approve and increase deal uncertainty.
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